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In the Supreine Court 
of the S·tate of Utah 
NELLIE DOWSETT, 
Plaintiff and Appella,nt, 
vs. 
DAR"\YIX DO\YSETT, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
7263 
While \Ve substantially agree with appellant's state-
ment of the evidence relating to the operation of the car 
by Harold H. Dowsett and Nellie Dowsett, his wife, 
father and mother of the defendant, Darwin Dowsett, we 
are not in accord with appellant's conclusions with re-
~prct thereto. 
\Vhile · in the Army at Camp Maxey, Tex-as, the de-
fendant, Darwin Dowsett, arranged for living quarters 
for himself and his wife at a little town caUed Paris 
near the military camp (Tr. 45-6). His wife, Evangeline, 
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arranged for her sister and. rnother to care for the two 
small children while she was gone. She, Evangeline, did 
not drive a car, but the family car, a 1940 Dodge four-
door sedan, record title of which was in her husband, 
Darwin Dowsett, was in her custody. vVhen it was used 
by her, she would get someone else to drive. Defendant's 
mother, Nellie Dowsett, had driven this car on occ-asions 
ever since defendant purchased it in 1942 (Tr. 5::3). She 
was an experienced driver, and as to the use of her own 
family car, she drove as frequently as her husband (Tr. 
55). 
Darwin testified he te'lephoned his wife abont two 
weeks before she left Salt Lake or Holladay, Utah, and 
asked: ''If she couldn't get l\1other and Dad to drive the 
car down." (Tr. 47). Thereafter, Evangeline phoned 
plaintiff, her mother-in-law, ''and asked her if she and 
her husband could drive the car down," and "asked her 
if she would like to go," ( Tr. 83) and "if she and her 
husband (Harold) could drive the car. Each was to 
relieve the other in the driving going down there" (Tr. 
84). About a week after the first phone call, Evangeline 
told her husband ''that she had made arrangements for 
them to bring it (the car) down'' (Tr. 56). N'othing 
was said about anyone else driving other •than 1\f r. and 
Mrs. Dowsett, and that was the extent of the arrange-
ments made (Tr. 85). 
The Dows,eitts left as planned at four o'clock A.l\1. 
July 30, 1945. They were proceeding east in Daniels 
Canyon ori U. S. Highway 40 about thirty-five miles eaRt 
of Heber, Utah. Harold Dowsett was driving; the plain-
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~· 
tl 
tiff, Xellie Dow~ett, hi~ wife, wn~ ~itting nPxt to him in 
the front ::'eat; and in the rPar were Evangeline and an-
other lady. a ~l r~. Thomas, who wa~ riding with them 
(Tr. 7~). ...\::-' the car reached the summit, the sunlight 
struck :,Jr. Dowsett in the face. He said: ".Just as we 
came to the top, why, just as levelled out, why the sun 
was right in my eyes·' so '·I couldn't see.'' He ''held 
the whee'l right steady and straight. I thought it was, 
switch off or change-something: it· didn't.'' He esti-
mated he may have traveled t"·o hunflred feet, something 
like that, hut further added: • 'I wouldn't know for sure, 
approximately, I don't know how far it was. I felt the 
car in the loose gravel, I put the brakes on" (Tr. 65-66). 
He did not remember anything further, as he was ren-
dered unconscious ( Tr. 67). It is undisputed that the 
car overturned, which resulted in plaintiff's injuries. 
There was nothing out of the ordinary or unexpected 
so far the highway and the operations of the car were 
concerned, other than the fact that the sun suddenly 
blinded the driver. 
Nellie Dowsett testified that she was turned talking 
to those in the hack seat and was not watching the road, 
but that she did not remember anything that was unusual 
at the time: that her husband wa;.; driving in an ordinary 
and usual manner ( Tr. 125) ; that he was paying atten-
tion to his driving, was on his proper side of the high-
wa~·. trave'ling at a speed of about thirty to thirty-five 
milP;.; per hour. He seemed to have perfect rontrol of 
•) 
.) 
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the car, and she had no criticism at all of the manner 
in which he was driving and made no objection thereto 
(Tr. 126). 
Evangeline testified that she had not noticed an~'­
thing unusual about the driving on the highwa~· (Tr. 82): 
that she did not expect an accident, and ~r r. Dowsett 
was driving along in the usual and ordinary manner at 
a reasonable rate of speed on his proper side of the 
highway; that he was watching where he was going and 
seemed to have perfect control of the car (Tr. 83). 
That was the sum and substance of the evidence, 
all elicited from plaintiff's witnesses, the only onrf' called 
being the four mentioned, namely: p1aintiff and her hus-
band, and the defendant, Darwin Dowsett, and his wife, 
Evangeline. 
At the conclusion of plaintiff's evidence, both parties 
rested, and defendant moved for a directed verdict upon 
several grounds (Tr. 13'5-136), as follows: 
"(1) The evidence affirmatively shows that 
the plaintiff and the driver of the automobile in 
which she was riding were fellow servants as a 
matter of law and that she cannot recover be-
cause of the fact that she was such a fellow 
servant. 
'' (2) That plaintiff is not for any reason a 
feHow servant, that she is then a guest in the 
automobile as a matter of law, and therefore can-
not recover. 
"(3) That the complaint does not state facts 
sufficient to constitute an action against the de-
f,endant. 
" ( 4) That plaintiff has failed to prove any 
negligent act on the part of the driver of the 
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automobile in which plaintiff wa~ riding. 
• · ( ;) ) That plaintiff has failed to prove that 
if there wai' any negligence on tlw part of the 
(lriY~r of th~ antmnobile in whieh plaintiff was 
riding, that ~uch net of nP§..?;ligenee, if an~·, \Va~ 
the proximate cause of the accident and resulting 
injuries. 
" ( 6) That the evidence affirmatively shows 
that the plaintiff failed to 1nake any obj·ection to 
the manner in which the antomobi'le was driven 
and acquiesced in the manner in which it was 
driven, and voluntarily asslnned the risk. 
" ( 7) That the evidence affirn1atively shows 
that if there was an~· negligence on the part of 
the driver of ~aid auton1obile, the plaintiff was 
herself gnilty of contributory negligence, which 
proximate!~· contributerl to the cause of the acci-
dent. 
·' ( 8) That it affirmatively appears from the 
evidence that the aecident was solely caused by 
reason of an unforeseen circumstance; namely, the 
blinding of the sun: and the accident was unavoid-
able so far a~ the driver wa~ concerned. 
'' (9) That the evidenee of the plaintiff is 
insufficient to go to the jury on any theory.'' (Tr. 
V~f>-6). 
QUESTIONS ON APPEAL 
The only question argued by appellant, and she 
insists that it is the only question before this court, is 
that the court erred in granting defendant's motion on 
the hasi:;; of the fellow ~ervant rule. 
Respondent contends that the lower court properly 
(lirectNl a verdict in favor of defendant based upon the 
fellow :-:eiTant ru'le, and also contends that there were 
other reasons wh~· defenrlant's motion was properl~T 
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granted. In other words, we are firmly convinced that 
all of the reasons exist for the application of the fellow 
servant rule in this case, but there wenc' also other 
grounds or reasons why the holding of the lower court 
was correct. It is a well-established rule in this and 
other jurisdictions that if the ruling of the 'lower court 
should be sustained on any grounds, the judgment should 
be affirmed. 
Trude,au v. Pacific States Box. & flasket ('o., 
(Wash.) 148 Pac. (2d) 453; 
Shaw v. O'B'yrne, 64 Utah 139, 2~8 Par. 570: 
Burningham v. Burke, 67 Utah 90, 245 Pac. 977: 
Badger & Co. v. Fidelity Build·ing & Loan .AssJu., 
75 Pac. (2d) 669, 94 Utah 97. 
Specific Q'.l·estions 
Specifically the legal questions can be summarized 
in the following propositions contended for by respond-
ent: 
I. If Darwin Dowsett had the .right to control the 
operations of the car to be driven by his father, Harold 
Dowsett, and his mother, Nellie Dowsett, then the latter 
were working in the same grade of service together and 
for a common purpose within the definition of a fellow 
servant under the Utah Statute, Section 49-6-2, Utah 
Code A'YI/YI)otated 1943. 
II. If Darwin Dowsett did not have the right to 
control the operations of the car as to how the car was 
to he driven, what route was to be taken, etc. (as con-
tended by appel~ant. See App. Br. page 11), then Harold 
and Nellie Dowsett were not servants or agents of the 
defendant, Darwin Dowsett, and plaintiff cannot recover 
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from defendant, Darwin Dowsett, because the negligence, 
if any there exi~ted, could not then be hnputed to him. 
III. If the foregoing reasons should not be exist-
ent, that is, if Nellie and Harold Dowsett were not 
agent~ or servants of the defendant, Darwin Dowsett, 
then Jl r~. Dowsett '"a~ a guest in the automobile and 
a~ no willful misconduct or intoxication was claimed or 
proved, there could he no liability. 
IV. Plaintiff voluntarily undertook the trip and 
acquiesced in the manner in which the car was driven 
and assumeel the ri:;;ks or hazards incident to the trip. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Application of Fe!low Servant Rule. 
Plaintiff insisted that she and her husband were 
acting for and on behalf of the defendant, Darwin Dow-
~ett, their son, in the operation of the automobile, and 
upon that premise claim that the negligence, if any, of 
Harold Dowsett, was imputed to defendant, and there-
fore that defendant is liable to the plaintiff, Nellie Dow-
~ett, his mother, for her husband's alleged negligence. 
The suit is one prosecuted by a mother against her son 
for her husband's negligence. 
If Harold Dowsett was the agent or servant of 
Darwin Dowsett, his son, for the purpose of driving 
the rar or delivering it to its ultimate destination at 
Camp Maxey, then the p'laintiff, Nellie Dowsett, was 
likewiPe an agent and servant for exactly the same pur-
pose. They were both requested and engaged to do the 
:-;amr thing. They had a common master. Their duties, 
if any, were eo-equal and to a common purpose, namely: · 
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to drive and deliver the c:1r to Camp ~faxey, Texa~. 
Neither was placed in charge of the other or entrusted 
with any superintendene~- or control over the other. Each 
was expected to relieve the other in driving during the 
trip. 
A. Reason and Basis for FeH:>w Servant Rule. 
The fellow-servant rule is recognized in the common 
law and is in effect that the negligence of one fellow-
servant will not be imputed to the principal or master 
in an action brought by a co-worker or a fe'llow-servant. 
The reason for the rule is based upon public policy and 
upon the doctrine of assumption of risk. It is an excep-
tion to the general rule of agency. -
The common law rule was early recognized hy the 
Utah courts, and the basis for the rule is summed up in 
Dryburg v. Milnilng & Millilng Co., 18 Utah 410, ;)f> Pac. 
367, as follows: 
''Before the enactment defining who shall be 
regarded as fellow servants, the Supreme Court 
of the late territory of Utah repeatedly held that 
the definition did not include all the agents and 
servants of the common master, but onl~· those 
employed in the same line of duty, and of the same 
grade and habitually associating and working to-
gether under such circumstances that the care, 
caution, and watchfulness of each may have an 
influence upon the others, promotive of diligence, 
care, and caution with respect to their common 
safety, and under such circumstances that each 
may have an opportunity of observing the con-
duct of the others, and of making proper sugges-
tions to him and to the common employer or hiR 
superintendent or proper agent, or of avoiding 
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;nl" 
· injnry from ~nch negJligenee. This smne rule Hw~· 
also be deduced frmn the decisions of the rourt:-; ol' 
other states. Daniels v. Railway Co., 6 Utah 357, 
23 Pac. 7G2: \Yebb v. Railroad Co., 7 Utah '363, 
2G Pac. ~lSl; Armstrong v. Railway Co., 8 Utah 
-±:20, -12 Pae. 693: Railway Co. v. :.'.! oranda, 108 
Ill. 5/G: :Jiill Co. v .. Johnson, 114 Ill. 57, 29 N. E . 
. 186; Railroad Co. v. Kelly, 127 Ill. 637, 21 N. ~. 
203.'' 
Prior to the enactn1ent of our Utah Statute, the 
co~ut poin~s out in.Armstroug z·. 0. S. L .. and Ut·ah North-
ern Ry. Co., 8 Utah .-120, 32 Pac. 693, that the rule had 
no application where the negligent aet. was the act of 
one in authority over the plaintiff. Said t~e court: 
"While it mav be reasonaWe to infer that 
men laboring together with equal 'a:u:thorit.y will, 
by their watchfulness, their suggestions, prudenee, 
and their example, influence eaeh other, it would 
be unreasonable to presume that they will so in-
fluence the men in authority over them, and to 
whose orders they are subjeet.'' 
Title 49, Chapter 6, Utah Code Annotated 1943, orig-
ina'lly adopted Revised Statutes of Utah 1898, dealing 
with fel:ow-fervants, now provides: 
· · -~:9-6-l. Yice Principal Defined. 
~\ll pPrsons engaged in the serviee of any 
person and intrusted by such employer with au-
thorit~- of superintendenee, control or command 
of other persons in the employ or service of such 
· employer, or 'vith authority to direct any other 
emp·;o~·cp in tlw performance of any duties of 
such employee, are vice principals of such em-
·ployer. and are not fellow servants. 
'' -l-~)-(i-2. Fellow Servants Defined. 
All persons who are engaged in the service of 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
any employer, and who while so engaged are in 
the same grade of service and are working to-
gether at the same> time and place and to a com-
mon purpose, neither of such persons being in-
trusted by such employer with an~· superintend-
ence or control over his fellow employees, arP 
fel~ow Fervants with eaeh other; }Jrovir!Pd, that 
nothing herein eontained shall be so ennstrued a~ 
to make the employees of such emplo~~er fellow 
servants with other employees engagc>d in any 
other department or service of sueh employer. 
Employees who do not eome within the provisions 
of this seetion shall not be ronsiflr:·prl fellow 
servants. '' 
In Southern Pacific Co. v. Schoer, (Ct. App. 8th 
Cir.) 114 Fed. 466, the court did not exempt the railroad 
company from liability in an action brought by a fireman 
injured by reason of the negligence of an engineer, who 
was entrusted with superior authority in the operation 
of the train, for the reason that the engineer was a vice 
principal within the definition of the statute. With re-
spect to the statute, the court said: 
''The purpose and effect of the sections of the 
statute of Utah which have been cited were not 
to change or to extend the liability of masters 
for the negligence of their servants, but their sole 
object and effect were to give an authoritative 
legislative definition of the terms 'vice princi-
pal' and 'fellow servant,' and to leave the lia-
bilities of the masters for the acts of their 
servants as they were before these sections 'verP 
enacted.'' 
The court made the observation that had the workmen 
been engaged in the same grade of service in the opera-
10 
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tion of the railrocHl. then the negligence would not have 
been imputed to the principal. 
In Lukic r. Southern Par. Co., ( Cir. Ct. Dist. Utah) 
lGO Fed. 135, the ronrt sustained a directed verdict for 
the defendant in an action brought by the plaintiff, a 
laborer in the construction of the road bed, based upon 
the alleged negligence of a brakeman of a construction 
train hauling gravel for the same road bed. A portion 
of the opinion foUows : 
''The true Yiew of the fellow servant excep-. 
tion to the general rule of the master's liability 
i:-: based on the doctrine of assumption of risk. 
The se1Tant realizes \Yhen he accepts the service 
that he is liable to inju r~7 h~· the negligence of 
other servants of the fame master, \Yhose service 
i:-: ~o related to his own that negligence on their 
part in the natura~ and expected course of events 
r1ay injure him, nohYithstanding a complete per-
formance h~· the master of his nonassignable 
duties. This anticipated risk the servant assumes, 
and his assumption is as broad as his reasonable 
antiripation of flang-er. 'Vhen the services of two 
:-o:()rrants are fo w-idely separated, so wanting in 
eon'act, that some unusual event must occur to 
flirect the resnlts of the negligence of the one to 
the other, the two are said to belong to separate 
departments. In the ease of Northern Pacific R. 
Co. v. I-Iambly, 1 f>4 1!. S. 349, 357, 14 Sup. Ct. 983, 
!lR4, 38 L. Ed. 1009, it was said: 
'' '.\s the laborer upon a railroad track, 
either in switching trains or repairing the 
track, is constantl~· exposed to the danger of 
rassing trains, and :bound to look out for 
them, any negligence in the management of 
~nch trains is a risk which may or should be 
11 
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contemplated by him in entering upon the 
service of the company .. This is probabl~· th(' 
most satisfactor~· test of liabi'lity. If the d~­
partments of the two ~ ervants flre so far 
separated from each other that the possibil-
ity of coming in contact, and hence of incur-
ring danger from the negligent performanc· • 
of the duties of such other department, coulrl 
not be said to be within the contemplation of 
the person injured, the doctrine of fellow 
service should not apply. In this Yiew it is 
not difficult to reconcile the numerous cases 
which hold that persons whose duty it is to 
keep railroad cars in good order and repair 
are not engaged in a common employment 
with those who run or operate them.' 
''And so in the case of Randall v. Baltimor~ 
& Ohio R. Co., 109 U. R. 478, 3 Sup. Ct. 322, 
27 L. Ed. 1003, it was held that a brakeman work-
ing a switch for his train on one track in a rai1-
road yard was a fellow servant of an enr.-ineer 
of another train on an adjacent track. It was 
pointed out ~that they were employed and paid h~· 
the same master and that the duties of the two 
brought them to work at the same time and placr 
for the common purpose of moving traim~, so that 
the negligence of one in doing. his work might 
injure the other. In Northern Pacific R. Co. Y. 
Charless, 162 U.S. 359, 16 Sup. Ct. 848, 40 L. Ed. 
999, a day laborer on a section was held to he 
a fellow servant .with the crew of a freight train: 
and in Martin v. Atchison, To:peka & Santa Fe, 
166 U. S. 399, 17 Sup. Ct. 603, 41 L. Ed. 1051, 
a similar laborer with the crew of a work tr.ain. 
"Now, what change has the statute made? 
It has, it is true, ingrafted the discredited superior 
servant limitation; hut that is not pertinent her<'. 
12 
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Beyond thi:-;, it providP~ that to bt> fellow servants 
the two servants mn~t be working together at the 
same time and place and to a eommon purpose. 
\Yhat is mean h~· 'together'? The Illinois doc-
trine of ron~ocia tion doe~ not require that the 
s •JTant~ should be doing the same kind of work, 
or he engaged in aiding each other in the same 
detail of labor. By 'together' is meant physical 
nearne~s at the time of the injury, coupled with 
the common purpose of the 1abors of the two 
~eJTant~: the nearne:-;~ required being only that 
,,·hich :-;hould arouse in the one a reasonable 
appreciation of probable danger from the neglect 
nf the other. 1 do not belieYp that the statute 
should be otherwi~P construed.'' 
B. Other Utah Cases. 
While in most of the cm:~es decided hy this court 
under the statute, it was held the facts were not sufficient 
to establish the feNow servant relation, in each of the 
cases so holding, the plaintiff was either working under 
a superior, or not working in the same place or grade of 
service. However, once the relationship exists as defined 
h~· the statute, there is no reason why the master or 
principal is not exempted from liability. 
In Dryburg r. Jf ercur Gold Mining & Milling Co., 
18 Utah 410, ;)5 Pac. 367, supra, the court held that there 
was a jury question as to whether plaintiff and a fenow 
miner were fellow servants where the p1aintiff was work-
ing in a mine about forty feet from the top of a ladder 
and was injured when going down the ladder for a sledge, 
and the claimed negligence was the negligence of another 
miner who worked in a tunnel twelve feet below in 
removing at an earlier time that morning, waste whieh 
13 
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had been supporting one of the uprights of the ladder. 
In Jenkins v. llfammoth Mining Company, 24 Utah 
513, 68 Pac. 845, it was held that a miner was not a fellow 
servant with one whose duty it was to manage and op-
erate a cage by which miners were conveyed in and out 
of the mine. Says the court: 
"The plaintiff and Knotts were employee8 
of the defendant, and neither was intrusted bv 
their emp~oyer with superintendence or rontr~l 
over the other; but in view of the evidence, and 
the provisions of said section, were theY engage<i 
in the same service, and working together at the 
same time and place, to a common pnrp'I~P 1 
Knotts was employed in running the elevator, 
while the occupation of the plaintiff was that of 
a miner on the 1,800 foot level of the mine. They 
were not, therefore, engaged in the same grade 
of service. Knotts' employment was not that of a 
miner, and he was not engaged. in working with 
the plaintiff on the 1,800 foot level; nor was thr 
plaintiff engaged at work when injured, but waB 
merely being conducted to his place of emploY-
ment. They were not, therefore, engaged in work-
ing together at the same time and place." 
In Meyers v. San Pedro Railroad Company, ~61Ttah 
307, 104 Pac. 736, it appeared that two sections of a train 
were operated as two distinct and independent trains. 
It was held that the members of the crew of one section 
were not fellow servants of the members of the crew of 
the other section. Says the court: 
"It is made to appear that the two sectionB 
of the train were run and operated as two distinrt 
and independent trains, and that the defendant 
regarded and treated them as being subject to 
14 
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the rule~ applirable to the running and operation 
of separate trains. The que~tion then arise~: .Are 
the member~ of train crews of separate trains 
fellow servants within the meaning of the statute? 
\Ye think they are not. They are not in such case 
·working tog·ether at the same time and place 
and to a rommon purpose.' '' 
In Shepherd t. Denver & Rio Grande Railroad Com-
pany, 41 Utah 469, 126 Pac. 692, the question before the 
court was whether the jury had been correct'ly instructed. 
In discussing the fellow servant rule, the court declares: 
• 'Before this exemption from liability can 
exist, however, our law requires that the hvo 
~ervants must be engaged in the same grade of 
service and working together at the same time 
and place and to a common purpose, and neither 
intrusted with any superintendence. or control 
over the other. The term 'same grade of service' 
does not mean whether theY earn the same amount 
of money, or whether they are doing exactly 
simi~ar work; but it means whether they are on 
the same level, so far as the exercise of an auth-
orit~~ over each other is concerned. The term 
'working together ·at the same time and place' 
does not mean whether they were working at the 
exact spot and doing exactly the same kind of 
work; but it means whether, in the discharge of 
their dutie~, they may fairly be said to be thrown 
in such contact with each other so that they have 
a fair opportunity of observing the habits and 
demeanor of each other, and thus are in a posi-
tion to form a conclusion as to the carefulness 
or noncarefulness of the habits and conduct. of 
the other. The term 'working to a common pur-
pose' means whether their work may fairly be 
said to he within some division or department 
15 
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of the defendant's business, and directed to some 
end within such division or department.'' 
In Vota v. Ohio Co~pper Comparny, 42 Utah 129, 129 
Pac. 349, the plaintiff, a mucker in a mine, was called by 
an engineer to assist in unloading timbers by means of a 
hoist and had his arm crushed between a tirn'ber and the 
hoist drum. Held the plaintiff and the engineer were not 
fellow servants. The decision was predicated upon a con-
sideration of what was the usual employment of the two 
servants rather than what they were doing at the time 
of the accident. Says the court: 
"Under the undisputed facts in this case, 
appellant's regular and usual emplo~·ment was 
that of a mucker in respondent's mine. He was 
temporarily transferred from the mine to assist 
in unloading timbers from railroad cars. The 
engineer in charge of the engine which was used 
to hoist the timbers was engaged in operating the 
engine. The two were, therefore, not, before they 
came together in unloading the timbers, engaged 
in the same grade of service within the meaning 
of our statute, although they were at the time 
of the accident working together at the same time 
and place and to a common purpose.'' 
In Shields v. Silver King Coali.tion Mines Co., 50 
Utah 138, 166 Pac. 988, plaintiff was working on the 1,000 
foot level, from which an incline extended upward to the 
900 foot level, on which incHne loaded cars were let down 
and empties drawn up, and plaintiff was injured by the 
negligence of a miner on the 900 foot level in letting one 
of the cars down. Held they were not fellow servants 
as they were not working together at the same time and 
place. r 
16 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In Arrascada r. ,t...,'ilr1T Kill!/ C'ualition Jfines Co.,:-)-~ 
Utah 386, 181 Pae. 159, plaintiff, a miner, who had been 
engaged in the con~trnction of a ehnte was directed to 
proceed to a higher leYel in the Inine to work, which might 
be more dangerous than what he wa~ doing. He inquired 
of miners above, who were drilling and blasting, if it wa~ 
safe, and receiving an affirmative an::-;wer, he proceeded 
upward and ·was struck hy a falling rock. Plaintiff was 
not present when the drillers were working and had 
nothing whatever to do with their work. Held drillers 
were not fellow servants of the plaintiff. Says the court: 
"In an elaborate argument it is contended 
that, even if Breen and Allen were negligent, 
the defendant is not liable, because they were 
fellm,· servants of the deceased. According to the 
evidence of plaintiffs, the deceased was not a 
fellow servant 'of Breen and Allen, or either of 
them. The working plarp of the deceased \Vas 
in the chute below the bulkhead. The working 
place of Breen and Allen was in the raise above 
the bulkhead. The deceased was doing timbering 
or carpenter work. Breen and AUen were doing 
the work of miners. In Dryburg v. l\1ercur Gold 
:.r. & ~f. Co., 18 Ftah 410, ;);) Pac. 367, it is said: 
" 'Two servants of a common master may be 
at work within five feet of each other, or a less 
distance, and still not be fellow servants. A wall 
may be between them, and the one may have no 
opportunity of knowing how the other performs 
his work.' '' 
C. Fellow Servant Cases in the Ope·ration of Automobiles. 
That the fellow servant rule is applied by the courts 
where the fellow se.rvamts are engaged in the operation 
of an automobile is iUustrated in the following cases. 
17 
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In Carter v. Uhrich, (Kan.) 264 Pac. 31, plaintiff 
was riding with a co-employee back to the factory after 
unloading a load at the railroad station. The judgment 
in favor of plaintiff was reversed on appeal and judg-
ment entered for defendant. Said the court: 
"We have no hesitancy in concluding that 
the injured workman in this case was a fellow 
servant of the driver of the truck and the doc-
trine of the assumption of risk caused by the 
negligence of a fellow servant should apply here 
and will prevent a recovery for the injury sus-
tained.'' 
In B~ack Diamond Lumber Co. v. Smlith, (Ark.) 76 
S.W. ('2d) 975, two employees were both truck drivers. 
Together they had delivered some lumber, picked up 
some furniture and were returning to their employer'R 
mill when the truck left the road. We quote: 
"Were Ward and Ogden fellow servantsT 
If they were then there can be no recovery. We 
have held that 'a truck driver transporting other 
employees of his master for the purpose of as-
sisting him in unloading a car of cement was a 
fellow servant for whose negligence causing in-
jury to one of such employees, the master wa~ 
not liable.' " 
The same result was reached in Charles Weaver a· 
Co. v. Harding, (Miss.) 180 So. 825, where plaintiff was 
riding to work in his employer's truck with other fellow 
employees. 
See also Buckley v. United Gas Public Service Co., 
(Miss.) 168 So.' 462, where plaintiff, an employee of a 
gas company crew laying a pipe line was injured while 
18 
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being transported from work in a trnek drivPn h~· a 
co-employee. 
Za.rski c. Creamer, (:~la~s.) ;)9 ~.E. (2d) 70-!; 
Blanchard r. Oallalia r, (Ga.) 33 ~.11~. ( 2d) 378, 
(where the rna ttPr wa~ disposed of on de-
murrer) : 
]{rndrick c. Ideal Hnldin9 Co., (Fla..) 188 So. 
778. 
D. There is No -Legal Distinction Between Principal and 
Agent and Mast,er ~nd Servant. 
Plaintiff argues there is a legal distinction betwN•n 
principal and agent and master and servant; however, 
these terms are used interehangeably in the law of torts. 
The right to cont'f'lol is the essential elen1ent whieh must 
h be present and whieh is the legal basis for imputing the 
!ll.i negligence of a servant or agent to his master or prin-
cipal. That no consideration of compensation is paid 
by the principa1 or master for the service rendered does 
not change the relationship. 
In McNeal v. illcKailn, (Okla.) 126 Pac. 742, it was 
held that a son was a servant of his father where he, 
the son, took a sister and a guest of the family riding 
in the father's automobile. No consideration was paid. 
Said the court : 
'' Y ehicles and nwtor cars may be used, not 
only for the business of the master for profit, hut 
also in his business for pleasure. If Paul, the 
minor son of the plaintiff in error, had been driv-
ing his father's carriage (whilst he was a mem-
ber of his family) in which were contained his 
sister and a guest of his father's house, the same 
being done by him with the express or implied 
consent of his father, the relation of master and 
19 
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servant would exist, and the father would he 
1liable for the negligent acts of the ._son whilst 
engaged in the driving of the carriage, and the 
same rule is supported by authority as to motor 
cars.'' 
In Jom.ik v. Ford Motor Co., (Mich.) 147 N."\V. 510, 
Werner purchased a car at the Ford Motor plant, which 
loaned one of its employees to assist the purchaser in 
driving the car to the outskirts of the city. The court 
held in so driving the car the Ford Motor car employee 
was the servant of. Werner and not the Motor Company, 
although there was ''no actual contract of employment 
be'tween them or payment for ser'/Jiice. '' Said the court: 
''tf an employer loans a servant to another 
for sonie special service, the latter with respect 
to that ·t,ervice may be liable as a master for the 
acts of the servant without any actual contract 
of employment between them or payment for 
service. (Citing authorities)." 
In Andre1as v. Cox, (Mo.) 23 S.W. (2d) 1066, a 
garagem~n in returning an automobile to the owner a~ 
an act of accommodation, no consideration being paid, 
was he~d to be a servant. Said the court: 
''One who drives a car as a mere accom-
modation or favor to the owner of the car i~ the 
servant of the owner.'' 
The master servant relationship was similarly held 
to exist in Baker v. M ase·ath, (Ariz.) 179 Pac. 53, al-
though there was no consideration paid the agent or 
servant. The terms master and servant and principal 
and agent were used interchangeably by the court. 
Similarly this court makes no distinction in JlcFar-
lane v. Winters, 47 Utah 598, 155 Pac. 437. H. is pointrcl 
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out that • ·the right to eontrol" ~~ tlw mw <'~~<'ll t ial n•-
quirement to e~tablish the relation~hip of prineipal an<l 
agent or ma~ter and servant in the opern·tion of an auto-
mobile. The eourt further held that that relationship wa~ 
not e~talJlished n~ between a father and son who wen• 
named eo-defendants upon proof that the father owned 
the ear and had pennitted hi~ son to drive a guest of the 
family to a nearby tmn1. 
In Fo.r v. Larender, 89 Utah 11:-l, 56 Pac. (2d) 1049, 
this court said at the bottom of page 118 of the Utah 
report: 
•' The test of whether one is the agent of the 
other depends upon ·the ri.ght of the control of 
one over the other. The san1e principles of agency 
apply to the running of an automobile as apply 
to any other field of action.'' 
Inasmuch as the right to control is required to estab-
lish the relationship of principal and agent or master 
t and servant, and as payment of compensation is not 
~· essential to the establishment of either relationship, there 
1 i~ no distinction between the two terms. What name is 
used or attached to the relationship cannot 1egally oper-
ate to change the actual character of such relationship. 
We may call :3f r. and _Mrs. Dowsett servants of the de-
fendant, Darwin Dowse~tt, whereas appellants may call 
them agents, but that does not make any actual legal 
distinction in the true character of 1:.he relationship. 
The true test is that the circumstances and condi-
tions enumerated in the statute exist, that is, that the 
persons involved are engaged in the same grade of serv-
ice and working together at the same time and place 
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and to a common purpose, and under such circumstances 
that 1the care, caution and watchfulness of each would 
normal~y have an influence upon the other promotive of 
diligence, care and caution with respect to their com-
mon safety, and such that each would have an oppor-
tunity of observing the conduct of the other and of mak-
ing proper suggestions 'to him or her or avoiding injury 
from such negligence. That is the basis of the rule 
defined by the statute and as aptly stated in the Dryburg 
v. Minitng ~and Millilng Compa;ny case, supra. 
It would be difficult to find a situation where those 
conditions are clearer than in the instant case. Harold 
and Nellie Dowsett were rendering a service for the same 
person, together at the same time and place, and to a 
comm.on purpose. Neither was charged with any super-
intendency over the other. They were equal in authority. :d 
Whil-e engaged together in ~the operation of the car, the 
manner in which one would drive wou1ld naturally tend 
to have an influence upon the conduct or care of the 
other. Each was interested in his or her own safety, and 
each concerned and intent upon reaching their destina-
tion in safety. These facts are established wi,thout dis-
pute through the testimony offered by the plaintiff. 
It follows the trial court did not err in directing a 
verdict upon the fellow servant rule. 
II. No Right to Control 
The only other distinction raised 1by appellant is that 
right to control is essential to the establishment of the 
relationship of master and servant, (see App. Br. page 
10). Appellant argues that as there was no riqlif to con-
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t!' 
trol a~ to defendant, Darwin Do\V~Ptt, then tlw rPla-
tionship of n1aster and ~<>rvant doP~ not exist. ~n~·~ 
appellant: 
"In the present ea~l' there wa~ a total a h-
sence of a right to control what wa~ to hr done. 
Danvin Dow~<='tt g·ave no directions a~ to how hi~ 
car was to be driven or as to what route wa:-; to 
be taken.·· (App. Br. page 11). 
\Ye concur in this view. Darwin Dowsett was not 
concerned and did not reserve any right to give direc-
tions as to hmv 'the car was to be driven, or as to what 
route was to be taken. His concern, if any, wa~ that the 
car ultimately reach its destination at Camp Maxey, 
Texas. He did not claim the right to control the actual 
operations and details of the trip. As to the defendant, 
Darwin Dowsett, the services being rendered by Harold 
and Nellie Dowsett, his father and mother, were in the 
nature, if anything, of independent services or an inde-
pendent contract, such as this court makes reference to 
in Fo.r r. Lavender, 89 Utah lJ;), 56 Pac. (2d) 1049, at 
page 120 of the Utah report: 
'' :\f any cases have loosely used expressions 
such as 'for and on behaU,' or 'in the business 
Df,' or 'for the benefit of.' As stated before, the 
inquir~· must be directed to the question of agency 
in the operation of the car rather than to the 
question of agency for the accomplishment of 
some ultimate pu.rpose. In the case of an inde-
pendent contractor a pen.;on may have the right 
of control over the act to be done at the destina-
tion or at the beginning, but another party or the 
driver himself may have control in the operation 
of thr car during ~the trip. In the case of a taxi-
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cab the fare has the right to control the destina-
tion but not t<;> control the operation of it.'' 
Those in the car had control of the sHuation. They 
had the right to determine when they left Salt Lake what 
route they would take, who they would visit if they so 
chose on the way, what sigbts they would see, when anct 
how far they would travel each day, or whether they 
would travel at alL Those in the car were in fact in 
complete C10ntrol of the situation as to the operations 
of the car. In fact, no one claims ~to the contrary. Appel-
lant so contends and defendant agrees. That matter 
appears without dispute. 
The fact that· the defendant, Darwin Dowsett, did 
not have the right to control the details of the trip is not 
inconsistent with defendant's contention that the fellow 
servant rule applies, because all the fundamental e~e­
ments of the fellow servant rule may exist and the 
nature of 1the service being rendered fall within the cate-
gory of that of an independent contractor or ulf}imate 
purpose rule as stated in Fox v. Lavender, supra. 
However, if there was no right to control, (and that 
there was none appears without dispute), there could be 
no liability whatsoever upon the part of the defendant, 
Darwin Dowsett, under the rule of respondeat superior, 
which is the on~y possible basis that he could be helct 
liable in any event. McFarlane v. Winters, 47 Utah 598, 
155 Pac. 437 supra . 
. III. If Mrs. Dowsett was not a fellow servant, she 
was a guest. 
The pertinent part of the Utah guest statute, Sec-
tion 57-11-7, provides as·follows: 
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··Any pt>rson who a~ a g-tw.~t accepts a ri(lP 
in any vehicle, nwving upon an~· of the public 
highwa~·::-: of the ~tate of Utah, and whi~P ~o riding 
a~ ~nrh gnP~t reePive~ or ~n~tain~ an injury, :-;hall 
have no right of rerover~· against the owner or 
driver or person responsible for the operation of 
~urh vehicle. * * * Xothing in this ~crtion shall 
he construed a~ relieving the owner or driver or 
person responsib'le for the operation of a vehicle 
frmn liability for injur~· to or death of such gue1't 
proximately resulting fron1 the intoxication or 
willful misconduct of such owner, driver or per-
son responsible for the operation of such vehicle; 
prorided, that in any action for death or for in-
jury or damage to person or property hy or on 
behalf of a guest or the estate, heirs or legal rep-
resentatives of such guest, the burden shall be 
upon plaintiff to establish that such intoxication 
or willfu~ misconduct was the proximate cause of 
such death or injury or damage." 
"57 -11-8. 'Guest' Defined. 
''For the purpose of this section the term 
'gue~t' is hereby defined as being a person who 
accepts a ride in any V<"hicle without giving com-
pensation therefor.'' 
If plaintiff was not a fellow servant in this case, then 
she was a guest within the terms of the foregoing stat-
ute, and cannot recover because no wilful misconduct or 
intoxication on the part of 'the driver or on the part of 
the defendant, Darwin Dowsett, was claimed or proved. 
IV. Assumption of Risk. 
The reason for the assumption of risk rule is simi-
lar in principal to the application of the fellow servant 
rule and is an additional reason in this case why aver-
dict was properly direCJted in defendant's favor .. vVhen 
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p~aintiff left home, she knew her husband's ability as a 
driver. She likewise knew the ordinary hazards which 
ar~ attendant upon such a trip, including the morning 
sun, which could and sometimes does have the effect of 
suddenly blinding, eastbound travelers at that time of the 
morning. 
Plaintiff testified that her· husband was driving in an 
ordinary a.nd usual manner ( Tr. -125) ; that he was pay-
ing attention to his driving, was on his proper side of 
the highway traveling rut a speed of about thirty to thirty-
five miles per hour. He seemed to have perfect control 
of the car, and she, plaintiff, had no criticism at all of the 
manner in which he was driving and made no objection 
thereto (Tr. 126). 
Mrs. Dowsett really did not blame her husband for 
the accident any more than she would bllame herself had 
she been driving and the sun suddenly blinded her. At 
the outset of the trip, she knew the dangers of traveling 
and the dangers which were incident to the operation of 
the car by herself and her husband. Under the condi-
tiDns, she and her husband were mutually undertaking to 
safely drive the car: Under such circumstances, she 
should not be entitled to recover against the defendant, 
Darwin Dowsett, who had no actual control or right 
to control the details of the trip. 
Where the risk is voluntarily assumed, plaintiff i::-~ 
not allowed to recover. Mabee v. Mabee, 79 Utah ;)S5,11 
Pac. (2d) 973. 
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SUMMARY 
\Ye haYt> outlined ~eyernl reason~ wh~· it wa~ prop·'r 
that a Yerdict be directed in this ea~P. 1_1lw defendant, 
Darwin Dow~ett, was not present in the car, and ad-
mittedly hi~ only conrPrn \Va~ the uHin1ate destination 
of the ear. Therefore, the only theory upon whieh he 
could be held liable at all would be under the doctrine 
of respondeat ~uperior. The undisputed lack of .right 
to control the automobile during the trip is sufficient and 
adequate reason for denying recovery in this case. That 
the rule of respondeat superior in ib app'lication often 
works an injustice or undue hardship upon the principal 
or master when he is not in actual possession and control 
of the automobile, but has merely a ri,qht to control, is 
recognized generally. However the law does not exJend 
liability to an owner who does not have the rlight to con-
trol, during the trip, although he is interested in th~ 
arrival at the ultin1ate destination. 
The decision in this case does not have to rest upon 
that rea~on alone. Assuming there were the right to con-
trol, the fe'llow servant rule would then apply for the 
reasons hereinabove outlined. \Ve have rather extensive-
ly reviewed the authorities upon that question and we 
are convinced of its application. 
If neither of those reasons exist, that is, if there was 
no agenc~· or a fellow servant involved, then plaintiff was 
a guest, and cannot recover for 'that reason. 
Fourth, plaintiff well knew the conditions under 
which she was traveling much better than defendant 
either knew or could have known. She and her husband 
;")-
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were in control of the situation. Knowing the conditions 
and having the he1tter opportunity to avoid an accident, 
it is more logical to conclude that she assumed the risk 
and the hazards of the trip than to attach liabiHty upon 
the def,endant, who admittedly had no control over ~the 
particular situation or operation of the car. 
If the court's ruling in directing a verdict was pro-
per upon any grounds (and it is not our intention to 
waive any of 1the grounds assigned), the decision and 
judgment of the lower court should be affirmed. 
We respectully submit that such should he the de-
cision of this court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
STEWART, CANNON & HANSOK 
E. F. BALDWIN, JR. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
and Respondent 
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